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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
ACQUIESCENCE(?) 
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK* 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a unique institution 
within the federal judiciary.  It is the only intermediate appellate court with 
nationwide jurisdiction over particular subject matter.  Only the Supreme 
Court has the same geographic scope.  Of particular importance is its appellate 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws. It is also unique that, given 
its patent expertise, it oversees an expert agency, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  This Essay explores the relationship of the Federal 
Circuit vis-à-vis the Supreme Court and the USPTO over three periods of time.  It 
first explores the early years of the court’s existence where, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s absence from the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit generally 
ignored—if not overruled—Supreme Court precedent.  Also during this period of 
time, the Federal Circuit generally refused to defer to the USPTO in a manner 
inconsistent with administrative law principles.  The second period of time was 
one of transition:  The Supreme Court began to reengage with patent law, 
generating resistance from the Federal Circuit.  Similarly, Supreme Court cases 
and legislative developments began to shift power in patent law away from the 
Federal Circuit and toward the USPTO.  The third and final era is one of 
acquiescence to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and deference to the 
USPTO.  However, two pending en banc cases may portend the end of this era 
of acquiescence, hence the question mark in this Essay’s title. 
 
                                                        
 *  Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.  My thanks to the American 
University Law Review for allowing me to participate in this tremendous and 
important annual event.  Thanks to Lucas Osborn, for comments on an earlier draft 
of this article, and Zach Stevenson, for helpful and timely research assistance.  © 
2016 Timothy R. Holbrook. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is unique in the 
federal judiciary.  It is the only permanent intermediate appellate 
court with national jurisdiction based on particular subject matter.1  
                                                        
 1. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 653 (2002).  Congress has, 
at times, created temporary courts with national jurisdiction over particular subject 
matter areas.  For example, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court of 
Appeals (TECA) to deal with issues arising from the Economic Stabilization Act of 
1970, which “authorized the President to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries, and 
to establish priorities for use and allocation of petroleum products.”  Tex. Am. Oil 
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  TECA 
dealt with particular issues, though, and not cases.  See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado 
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838 n.3 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 820–21 n.1 (1988) (Stevens, 
J., concurring)).  It was staffed with current Article III judges on a part-time basis.  See 
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. 
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It was created by merging two existing courts—the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the Court of Claims.2  Unlike other 
courts, it was also charged with a particular mission by Congress:  to 
bring uniformity to the nation’s patent laws.3  The regional circuits 
had created such a tangle of doctrine, with some circuits being rather 
hostile to patents, that forum shopping was rampant.4  By centralizing 
expertise at the appellate level, Congress hoped to reduce such 
shopping, generate a uniform body of patent law, and enhance the 
value of patents within the United States.5 
The Federal Circuit is uniquely situated.  Though inferior to the 
Supreme Court, it nevertheless also has national jurisdiction in 
patent law.6  It seemingly has expertise in patent law in a way that the 
generalist Supreme Court does not.7  When coupled with the 
Supreme Court’s inattention to patent law prior to, and immediately 
following, the court’s creation, the Federal Circuit appeared in its 
early years to be the “de facto supreme court of patents.”8 
The Federal Circuit also has appellate jurisdiction over an expert 
agency, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).9  
Normally, when a court reviews administrative agency decisions, the 
appellate court is a generalist court with no particular expertise.10  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit effectively has 
expertise in administrative law, but the court does not have specific 
                                                        
L. REV. 1111, 1111–12 (1990).  Ultimately, TECA’s jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Federal Circuit.  See Tex. Am. Oil Corp., 44 F.3d at 1561. 
 2. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 
AM. U. L. REV. 961, 975 (2014). 
 3. Alan D. Lourie, Foreword, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 764 (2016). 
 4. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in 
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (2003) (describing the 
problems with regional circuit review of patent law). 
 5. See id. at 261 (stating that Congress aimed to “promote certainty” in patent 
cases (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981))); R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115–16 (2004). 
 6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012). 
 7. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (describing the Federal Circuit as “a sustained 
experiment in specialization”). 
 8. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 387, 387; see also Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 
AM. U. L. REV. 577, 577–79 (1992) (highlighting the court’s internal review 
procedures as a reason for the Supreme Court’s minimal involvement). 
 9. See § 1295(a)(4)(A). 
 10. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 1, at 1111. 
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expertise in any particular regulatory area.11  In contrast, the Federal 
Circuit shares an area of substantive expertise with the USPTO.12  
Indeed, one of the Federal Circuit’s predecessors, the CCPA, had 
appellate jurisdiction over the USPTO.13  As such, early in its 
creation, the Federal Circuit and the USPTO often had “turf wars” 
over what deference was owed to the Agency.14 
More recently, however, these dynamics appear to have shifted.  
The Supreme Court has reengaged with patent law, and, after an 
initial period of resistance, the Federal Circuit increasingly is 
following the Court’s precedent with little pushback.15  Additionally, 
after some Supreme Court intervention and the passage of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA),16 the Federal Circuit has begun 
treating the USPTO with greater deference in a manner akin to how 
most appellate courts review administrative agencies.17 
This Essay explores the transformation of the Federal Circuit and 
its recent acquiescence to both the Supreme Court and the USPTO.  
It offers some explanations for this transformation and then looks to 
the pending en banc decisions in In re Aqua Products, Inc.18 and Wi-Fi 
One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.19 to foresee whether such post-AIA 
deference will continue. 
I. THE EARLY YEARS:  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AS THE SUPREME COURT 
OF PATENT LAW 
Congress created the Federal Circuit after years of study and 
debate over how to create uniformity in certain areas of law and to 
reduce the federal courts’ overloaded docket.20  Some viewed this 
                                                        
 11. Id. at 1123.  See generally John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. 
Circuit:  Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553 
(2010) (discussing the D.C. Circuit as a quasi-specialized court and comparing it to 
the Federal Circuit). 
 12. See § 1295(a)(4). 
 13. See Cotropia, supra note 4, at 259. 
 14. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 15. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 16. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 17. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 18. 833 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 19. Nos. 2015-1944, 2015-1945, 2015-1946, 2017 WL 957224, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 
4, 2017) (per curiam). 
 20. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 1114 (describing the Federal 
Circuit as a “calculated institutional design refined over two decades”); see also History 
of the Federal Judiciary, Landmark Judicial Legislation:  Federal Circuit Act 1982, FED. JUD. 
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new appellate entity as an experiment with expert courts.21  As such, 
the Federal Circuit was a bit of an oddball at its creation.  It thus had 
a challenge before it:  It needed to take the unruly patent doctrine of 
other courts and attempt to create some uniformity in the law.  But it 
had to do so while reviewing the judgments of district courts that 
were utterly unfamiliar with this new court way off in Washington, 
D.C.  In other words, the Federal Circuit had to demonstrate its 
legitimacy to the district courts and perhaps to other institutions.22  
At times, the enterprise did not appear to go well.23  Nevertheless, the 
atmosphere surrounding the court’s creation may offer some 
explanation for the two dynamics this Part discusses:  the Federal 
Circuit willfully ignoring Supreme Court precedent with which it 
disagreed and the Federal Circuit’s refusal to defer to the USPTO.  
Ultimately, the court appeared to be aggrandizing power over the 
patent system at the intermediate appellate level. 
A. The Federal Circuit Cleans up Patent Law—and Ignores (Overturns?) 
Supreme Court Precedent 
When the Federal Circuit was created, it had a monumental task on 
its hands:  creating uniformity from the morass of patent case law 
developed by the regional circuits.24  The law varied widely from 
circuit to circuit, which was part of the reason for creating the 
Federal Circuit.25  Implicit in such circuit variation is the reality that 
the Supreme Court was not terribly engaged in patent law and let 
                                                        
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2017). 
 21. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7. 
 22. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 973, 986–87 (2015) (examining the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy in 
the patent space vis-à-vis its interactions with the Federal Circuit). 
 23. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) (“[The patent case] goes to the Federal 
Circuit afterwards.  You know, it’s hard to deal with things that are ultimately 
resolved by people wearing propeller hats.” (quoting O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 
95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996))). 
 24. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 651 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting “the divergence among the federal 
circuits in their interpretation of patent issues” as partly “provid[ing] support for the 
congressional decision in 1982 to consolidate appellate jurisdiction of patent appeals 
in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”). 
 25. Id. 
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these differences develop and fester.26  In that regard, the Supreme 
Court was partly at fault for the disarrayed state of patent law.27 
From this perspective, the Federal Circuit’s assertion of itself as the 
“supreme court of patent law” is unsurprising.  The court faced a 
daunting task of assimilating the disparate doctrines into a uniform 
body of law.28  It also had to earn respect and legitimacy in the eyes of 
the district courts.29  The court therefore needed to take clear and 
fairly aggressive positions vis-à-vis patent law. 
Given the legitimacy concern, it also makes sense that the Supreme 
Court remained absent during the Federal Circuit’s early years.  If the 
Supreme Court had intervened frequently, particularly on matters of 
substantive patent law, then the new court may have looked weak and 
inferior to its peers.  The Supreme Court’s hands-off approach allowed 
the Federal Circuit to mature and to consolidate various doctrines. 
And hands-off the Supreme Court was.  The Court rarely took patent 
cases.30  When it did, they typically involved procedural or constitutional 
law issues.31  The Court infrequently addressed core patent law 
doctrines.32  In one of the rare cases during this period in which the 
Supreme Court did review substantive patent law, the Court criticized 
                                                        
 26. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the 
Bar of Patents, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275 (2002) (“[The Supreme Court] seemed to lose 
interest in the field at mid-century, and the Court’s patent docket precipitously 
declined.  For the next three decades, the Court averaged barely one patent decision 
per year . . . .”); Janis, supra note 8, at 391 (noting that providing discretionary review 
of patent cases to the Supreme Court meant “the Court’s involvement in routine 
patent matters ceased”). 
 27. Duffy, supra note 26, at 276 (“The Federal Circuit was created in part because 
of the Supreme Court’s then decades-long neglect of the field . . . .”). 
 28. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary, 527 U.S. at 651; Dreyfuss, supra note 7. 
 29. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 30. See supra notes 26–27. 
 31. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit 
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6 & n.30 (2003).  The 
Supreme Court did address the doctrine of equivalents on the merits in Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., considering both the all-elements rule and 
prosecution history estoppel.  520 U.S. 17, 24, 29–30, 40–41 (1997).  It appears to 
me, however, that the Court was partially duped, thinking that the case implicated 
Seventh Amendment jury trial rights.  Id. at 37 (“The various opinions below, 
respondents, and amici devote considerable attention to whether application of the 
doctrine of equivalents is a task for the judge or for the jury.”).  The Court ultimately 
declined to answer that question.  Id. at 38. 
 32. See Holbrook, supra note 31, at 6. 
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the Federal Circuit (now ironically) for offering too little certainty 
regarding the substantive standard for the on-sale bar to patentability.33 
The Federal Circuit took advantage of the Supreme Court’s 
abdication of judicial supremacy in patent law.  The court quickly 
began to clarify the law, even if, at times, its decisions seemed to 
conflict with earlier Supreme Court precedent.  For example, the 
Federal Circuit jettisoned the concept of “combination patents.”34  It 
discarded the doctrine that an invention is obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 
103 if it was “obvious to try.”35  It elevated the importance of the 
secondary indicia of non-obviousness, noting that a court must 
consider these factors if in evidence.36  The court dramatically 
                                                        
 33. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1998) (rejecting the Federal 
Circuit’s multi-factor test determining the trigger for the on-sale bar to patentability).  But 
see Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:  Implications 
of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the on-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 933, 933 (2000) (asserting that the Court’s test in Pfaff had little effect on the 
law because the lower courts’ application of it diverged significantly). 
 34. See, e.g., Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587, 593 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (reiterating that the Federal Circuit does not adhere to the premise that 
non-obviousness is difficult to find in combination patents and “if it was obvious to 
try combining elements, the combination itself must be obvious”); Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding no statutory 
distinction between combination patents and other types of patents, and that 
classification of combination patents confuses the law).  But see Sakraida v. Ag Pro, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976) (“Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims 
with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in 
an assembly of old elements.” (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950))). 
 35. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (pointing to “obvious to try” as the incorrect obviousness standard but noting 
the hotly contested debate over the issue); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“‘Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute obviousness.”); Milliken, 
739 F.2d at 593; Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]reating 
the advantage as the invention disregards the statutory requirement that the 
invention be viewed ‘as a whole,’ ignores the problem-recognition element, and 
injects an improper ‘obvious to try’ consideration.”).  But see Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282 
(reasoning that the reordering of old system elements may have produced “more 
striking results,” but those results were still the product of the old elements 
functioning in the same manner as before).  The concept of obviousness compares a 
patent-hopeful invention with current patented inventions to ensure that the 
processes, the functions, and the technology are readily distinguishable by a person 
with ordinary skills in the area that the patent-hopeful invention seeks to enter.  
Daniel A. Tysver, Patent Requirements, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/patent/requi 
rements.html#nonobvious (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
 36. Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1574 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (“[T]he trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider the 
evidence of secondary considerations . . . .”).  But see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
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expanded what constituted patentable subject matter.37  And it made it 
easier for patent applicants to demonstrate an invention’s utility, 
seemingly in tension with the Supreme Court precedent on the issue.38 
B. The Federal Circuit Asserts Its Dominion over the USPTO 
When Congress created the Federal Circuit, the court inherited the 
CCPA’s jurisdiction over the USPTO’s patent validity and 
interference determinations.39  The initial judges on the Federal 
Circuit were the judges of both the CCPA and the Court of Claims.40  
As such, the CCPA judges brought with them their previous 
experience with the USPTO. 
                                                        
U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (“Such secondary considerations . . . might be utilized to give light 
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be 
patented.” (emphasis added)).  A district court highlighted this shift: 
[T]he Supreme Court [in Graham] noted that secondary considerations 
“may be relevant in particular cases.”  [Graham, 383 U.S. at 18].  Teva argues, 
based on this language, that consideration of such evidence is discretionary, 
not mandatory.  The Federal Circuit, however, has clearly instructed that 
secondary considerations must be considered in every case in which they are 
present.  See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, Inc., 
807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  “Arguably, the Federal Circuit has more 
eagerly employed [secondary considerations] than th[e] Supreme Court 
language [in Graham] would suggest.”  ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS, 
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 163 (2d ed.).  This Court is bound by the Federal 
Circuit precedent unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it. 
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 n.1 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original). 
 37. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60, 960 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc); see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[A]s this 
court has recently held, virtually anything is patentable.” (citing State St. Bank, 149 
F.3d 1368)).  See generally John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 
B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1159 (1999) (“This aberrant reinterpretation of Diehr and 
Chakrabarty does a disservice to the many Federal Circuit opinions that have applied 
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in patent eligibility determinations.”). 
 38. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding tumor models 
sufficient for utility).  But see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) 
(requiring “specific benefit [that] exists in currently available form”). 
 39. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1125. 
 40. See History of the Federal Judiciary:  U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, FED. 
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2017); see also Jim Davis, Formation of the Federal Circuit, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 
547, 548 (2002) (mentioning multiple judges from the Court of Claims that moved 
over to the Federal Circuit). 
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The CCPA, much like the current Federal Circuit, was an expert 
Article III court overseeing an expert agency.41  Moreover, the CCPA 
always sat en banc, which meant that its earlier decisions were not 
binding precedent.42  Instead, the court was only bound by stare 
decisis.43  As a result, the CCPA would, on occasion, change its law after 
a fairly short period of time.44  The CCPA also had a contentious 
relationship with the USPTO.  For example, the CCPA and the USPTO 
wrestled with the definition of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a dispute 
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in favor of the USPTO.45 
Given this history, it is somewhat unsurprising that the Federal 
Circuit, early in its existence, similarly refused to treat the USPTO as 
a typical agency.46  The Federal Circuit embraced its own role in 
supervising substantive patent law, particularly given that the USPTO 
had no substantive rulemaking authority.47  In some ways, it was as if 
                                                        
 41. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1131 n.98 (explaining that Congress enacted 
legislation in 1956 designating the CCPA as an Article III court). 
 42. Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re 
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 43. Deckers Corp., 752 F.3d at 962–63 (explaining that the CCPA would only 
overturn a prior ruling upon a finding of clear error). 
 44. See, e.g., In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 990 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (overruling, two years 
later, In re Palmquist’s “time when the invention is made” approach with an 
anticipatory filing approach); H.W. Robinson Air Freight Corp. v. United States, 48 
C.C.P.A. 148, 152–53 (1961) (overruling, five years later, the court’s prior decision in 
United States v. Damrak Trading Co., 43 C.C.P.A. 77 (1956), for “clear error”). 
 45. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 522 n.4, 529 (1966) (noting the “clear 
conflict between the Patent Office and the CCPA”).  The Supreme Court ultimately 
agreed with the USPTO that the invention at issue—a method for making steroids of 
unknown practical use—lacked utility.  Id. at 531–32.  Some judges at the CCPA pushed 
back at the Supreme Court after Brenner, foreshadowing the Federal Circuit’s initial 
resistance to the Supreme Court’s interventions.  See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 948 
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (arguing that the Court should distinguish Brenner, not extend it). 
 46. Cf. Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush:  The Role of Deference to PTO Patent 
Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 201 (2000) (criticizing the Federal Circuit for 
“refus[ing] to apply administrative law principles” when reviewing patents denied by 
the USPTO). 
 47. See, e.g, Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that 
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) did not grant the USPTO with “general substantive 
rulemaking power”), vacated en banc, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam); Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that 
Chevron deference did not apply to the USPTO on substantive patent law 
questions); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458–59 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(holding that the Federal Circuit applied a “heightened level of scrutiny” over 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference’s decisions to ensure that the 
court could properly “oversee complex legal determinations such as 
obviousness”), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
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the Federal Circuit viewed the expert agency as the court’s 
handmaiden when it came to substantive patent law. 
A number of cases demonstrate this dynamic.  For example, in In re 
Donaldson Co.,48 the Federal Circuit addressed the manner by which the 
USPTO interpreted claims in “means-plus-function” format pursuant to 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.49  That provision permits the use of functional 
limitations in claims, but such limitations are construed to cover only the 
structures disclosed in the specification that perform the claimed 
function as well as equivalents to those structures.50  The USPTO, 
however, refused to apply the statute.  Instead, the agency simply looked 
for anything in the prior art that would perform the claimed function 
regardless of whether that structure had been disclosed in the patent.51  
In other words, the USPTO construed means-plus-function claims to 
cover any means of performing the claimed function.52 
The Federal Circuit in Donaldson rejected the USPTO’s claim 
construction approach, concluding that it was inconsistent with the 
clear statutory mandate.53  The court held “that paragraph six applies 
regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-
function language arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability 
determination in the [US]PTO or as part of a validity or 
infringement determination in a court.”54  The court also overruled 
CCPA precedent that appeared to countenance the USPTO’s 
approach.55  In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected the USPTO’s 
                                                        
 48. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2006); Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1192.  Congress 
renumbered this section when it passed the America Invents Act so that, under 
current law, the proper citation is § 112(f).  At the time of Donaldson, however, the 
convention was to describe § 112 based on the paragraphs within that section as they 
were not numbered.  Because the case used the old version of § 112, I will use the 
older convention. 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 
 51. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193 (noting that the USPTO refused to consider 
structure in specification). 
 52. Id. at 1193 n.3 (highlighting the USPTO’s “practice of interpreting means-plus-
function language as reading on each and every means of performing that function”). 
 53. Id. at 1193 (clarifying that Congress’s language in paragraph six mandates 
that the USPTO, when “construing means-plus-function language in a claim,” view 
the specification according to all relevant factors such as “structure, material, or acts 
described therein,” if available). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1193–94 (overruling In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957), and 
In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1953), as well as “any other precedent of this court 
suggest[ing] or hold[ing] to the contrary”). 
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long-used practice,56 one that seemingly had been endorsed by the 
Federal Circuit’s predecessor.57  Importantly, the Federal Circuit 
specifically rejected the USPTO Commissioner’s argument that his 
position was “entitled to deference in view of what the Commissioner 
alleges is the [US]PTO’s sweeping and long-standing practice of not 
applying paragraph six during examination.”58  The court noted that 
the USPTO’s “fail[ure] to adhere to a statutory mandate over an 
extended period of time does not justify its continuing to do so.”59  
The court also concluded that there was no ambiguity in the statute 
as to whether it applied to patent prosecution, thus eliminating 
another potential avenue for affording the USPTO’s approach some 
deference.60  The court, therefore, asserted its dominion over the 
expert agency, rejecting decades-old procedures and overruling 
precedent that embraced that approach.  In this sense, the court’s 
decision in Donaldson is a striking managerial decision. 
Perhaps no case exemplifies the tension between the Federal 
Circuit and the USPTO better than In re Kemps.61  The case was a run-
of-the-mill obviousness case, but the USPTO used it as a vehicle to 
advocate for a different standard of review of its factual 
determinations.62  The Federal Circuit had long held that it reviewed 
USPTO fact-finding under the “clearly erroneous” standard.63  In 
previous cases, the USPTO had argued to change the standard to the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)64 “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard.65  In Kemps, however, the USPTO—in the words of the 
                                                        
 56. See Thomas L. Stoll & Kara A. Farnandez, Means for Functioning in a Vacuum?, 
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 239, 243 (1994) (noting that the Federal Circuit 
had “reversed . . . a long standing policy”). 
 57. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 548 (“[N]otwithstanding the third paragraph of section 
112, it is the language itself of the claims which must particularly point out and 
distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention, 
without limitations imported from the specification, whether such language is 
couched in terms of means plus function or consists of a detailed recitation of the 
inventive matter.”), overruled by Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189. 
 58. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996), abrogated by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
 62. Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1430. 
 63. See, e.g., In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]e review any 
underlying facts found by the Board under the clearly erroneous standard.”). 
 64. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 65. Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1431 n.4; see, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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Federal Circuit—“presumptuously assumed this standard for briefing 
and argument” without arguing for en banc reconsideration.66 
Needless to say, the Federal Circuit was not pleased.  The court 
noted that “[t]he briefing of the entire case by the [US]PTO under 
the incorrect standard was inappropriate.”67  The court faulted the 
USPTO for “unfairly burden[ing] the applicant” who “felt like ‘a 
bystander to some long-running dispute to which he really is not a 
party.’”68  The court also faulted the USPTO for failing to argue for en 
banc consideration:  “the [US]PTO simply declared that the standard 
of review was ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ briefed the case as such, and 
effectively disregarded the substantial precedent behind the court’s 
standard of review, with only a footnote recognizing the correct 
standard.”69  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that this case 
would have been decided the same way under either standard; 
therefore, the issue was not ripe for decision.70  The court concluded, 
Accordingly, regardless of the merits of the [US]PTO’s argument 
that the APA standard should be applied, the use of that standard 
in this case was inappropriate and unnecessary.  It unfairly 
burdened Kemps and did not present an issue requiring 
determination.  Under these circumstances, we consider the 
[US]PTO’s brief and argument less forthright than we expect and 
normally receive.71 
Acting on a somewhat odd suggestion by the Federal Circuit,72 the 
USPTO eventually did find an appropriate vehicle to challenge the 
standard of review en banc.73  The en banc Federal Circuit 
considered the arguments made by the USPTO but remained 
unpersuaded, maintaining the “clearly erroneous” standard and 
concluding that the standard was exempt under the APA.74  The 
Federal Circuit stated that 5 U.S.C. § 559 exempted the USPTO from 
                                                        
 66. Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1431 & n.4. 
 67. Id. at 1430–31. 
 68. Id. at 1431. 
 69. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 889 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The argument is 
appropriately made in a petition suggesting rehearing in banc, in a case such as this, 
wherein the court has decided that clear error by the Board requires reversal.” 
(emphasis added)), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), 
rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 73. Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447. 
 74. Id. at 1449. 
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“arbitrary and capricious” review.75  Tellingly, the court noted that 
the clear error standard helps “avoid situations where board fact 
finding on matters such as anticipation or the factual inquiries 
underlying obviousness become virtually unreviewable.”76  This 
language suggests that, to some extent, the Federal Circuit distrusts 
the USPTO’s determinations. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit.  The Court 
granted certiorari and held that the APA does apply to USPTO fact-
finding, although it declined to determine which APA review standard 
applied.77  The Federal Circuit subsequently adopted the “substantial 
evidence” standard of review,78 thus denying the USPTO its original 
goal of a highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard. 
Moreover, even in the face of seeming defeat by the Supreme Court 
in favor of the USPTO, the Federal Circuit pushed back a bit more.  
Perhaps in a case of “be careful what you wish for,” the Federal Circuit 
made clear that the USPTO’s fact-finding must be supported by the 
evidence of record and not merely from the expertise of the Agency.79 
The Federal Circuit’s tough treatment of the USPTO is not 
surprising.  The expert court is reviewing the expert agency, and it is 
foreseeable that the court would want to assert its supremacy. 
The above discussion, however, is not meant to suggest that the 
Federal Circuit always disagreed with the USPTO.  At times, the court 
did agree with moves by the Agency.  For example, the State Street 
                                                        
 75. Id. at 1452.  Section 559 states that “[the provisions of this section] do not 
limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized 
by law.”  5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).  Because the USPTO predates the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), the court concluded that the “clearly erroneous” standard 
arose prior to the APA and thus fell within the exception.  Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452. 
 76. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1458. 
 77. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 154, 165; see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (highlighting the Supreme Court’s failure in Dickinson to approve an 
appropriate standard of review for the USPTO’s finding of fact as either (1) the 
arbitrary and capricious test or (2) the substantial evidence test). 
 78. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313. 
 79. In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
APA’s “[d]eferential judicial review” provision reinforces the agency’s requirement 
for evidence-based findings); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“With respect to core factual findings in a determination of patentability, however, 
the Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding or 
experience—or on its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common 
sense.  Rather, the Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in 
support of these findings.”). 
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Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.80 case came to the 
Federal Circuit from district court infringement litigation and not 
from the USPTO.81  The Federal Circuit ultimately confirmed the 
patentability of business methods (albeit for a limited time).82  
Necessarily, for this issue to arise in litigation, the USPTO had 
already begun issuing patents on business methods, so the State Street 
decision confirmed what the USPTO had already been doing:  issuing 
business method patents.83  The Federal Circuit also agreed with the 
USPTO when it made the utility standard “more stringent”84 in the 
face of patent applications on gene fragments.85 
Nevertheless, in this early era, the Federal Circuit was willing and 
able to disagree with the USPTO in areas where one might think a 
court should defer.  The expert court, in the face of an absent 
Supreme Court, was arrogating power to itself at the expense of the 
expert agency it reviewed. 
II. THE TRANSITION:  SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION AND 
ASCENDANCE OF THE USPTO AS AN AGENCY 
The Supreme Court’s relative absence in matters handled by the 
Federal Circuit began to change at the turn of the millennium.  The 
Court started to send signals that it was concerned with both the 
institution and the doctrine of the Federal Circuit.  Meanwhile, the 
Federal Circuit, in the face of a reengaging Supreme Court and a new 
patent statute, began to treat the USPTO differently.  This Part 
discusses the transition. 
                                                        
 80. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 81. Id. at 1370. 
 82. See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 525–26 (2011) (noting 
that the Federal Circuit first addressed and upheld the patentability of business 
methods in State Street but backtracked on its approval ten years later in Bilski). 
 83. See id. at 523–25 (positing that the USPTO, reacting to the rapidly changing 
landscape of patents, began to issue business method patents without an “explicit 
signal of validity from the Federal Circuit”). 
 84. Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 100 (2000) (acknowledging that the USPTO, after 
implementing the new stringent utility standard, expected applicants to challenge its 
validity in federal court or with the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences). 
 85. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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A. The Supreme Court Takes a Harsher Tone with the Federal Circuit 
The Supreme Court may have been invisible for the first twenty or 
so years of the Federal Circuit.  But the Court began to indicate that 
the sleeping giant was about to awaken. 
The earliest tea leaves could be seen in the Court’s decision in Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.86  This case is effectively a 
“bookend” to Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,87 as the 
Court took Festo as a chance to correct the Federal Circuit’s 
misapprehension of Warner-Jenkinson.88  In doing so, the Court was 
not kind.  Whereas the Court in Warner-Jenkinson used deferential 
language in discussing the Federal Circuit’s expertise,89 the Court in 
Festo chastised the Federal Circuit for “ignor[ing] the guidance of 
Warner-Jenkinson.”90  The Court noted that “[t]he responsibility for 
changing [rules regarding the doctrine of equivalents and 
prosecution history estoppel] rests with Congress.  Fundamental 
alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations 
of inventors in their property.”91  There was no deference to the 
Federal Circuit’s expertise in this case. 
Perhaps the most telling case foreshadowing the Court’s 
reengagement with patent law and the Federal Circuit was Holmes 
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.92  The Federal 
Circuit’s decision in the case was of no moment:  a non-precedential 
order sending the case back to the district court to reconsider its 
judgment in light of the Supreme Court’s trade dress functionality 
decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.93  The Court 
nevertheless took the case to address the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction 
over appeals where the patent cause of action arose in the 
                                                        
 86. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 87. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 88. Id. at 41; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in 
Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 72 (2012) (describing Festo as a “bookend” to the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence that started with Warner-Jenkinson). 
 89. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (“We leave it to the Federal 
Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, 
consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.”); id. at 40 (“[W]e see no 
purpose in going further and micromanaging the Federal Circuit’s particular word 
choice for analyzing equivalence. . . .  [W]e leave such refinement to that court’s 
sound judgment in this area of its special expertise.”). 
 90. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
 93. 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
13 F. App’x 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated, 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
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counterclaim.94  Rejecting a long-standing Federal Circuit rule, the 
Supreme Court held that a compulsory counterclaim of patent 
infringement did not trigger the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.95 
Although the majority decision rested solely on its statutory 
interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s “arising under” jurisdiction, 
Justice Stevens went on to comment on the importance of the Court’s 
decision.96  His remarks revealed a suspicion of the Federal Circuit as 
an expert court: 
Necessarily, therefore, other circuits will have some role to play in 
the development of this area of the law.  An occasional conflict in 
decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this 
Court’s attention.  Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with 
broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the 
specialized court may develop an institutional bias.97 
The Court sent a similar signal, particularly with respect to patent-
eligible subject matter, in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,98 in which it dismissed the writ of certiorari 
as improvidently granted.99  Three justices dissented, however, in 
telling fashion.  Writing for the three, Justice Breyer concluded that 
the patent at issue clearly did not constitute eligible subject matter.100  
In particular, Justice Breyer noted an important role for the Supreme 
Court in patent law:  “a decision from this generalist Court could 
contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists 
and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently 
administered and enforced, adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ 
that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’”101 
The Federal Circuit began to react to such browbeating.  In In re 
Bilski,102 the court took pains to interpret fairly inconsistent Supreme 
Court precedent103 regarding subject matter eligibility to divine an 
                                                        
 94. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827. 
 95. Id. at 834. 
 96. Id. at 835 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 839. 
 98. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam). 
 99. Id. at 125. 
 100. Id. at 137–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 138 (omission and alteration in original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)). 
 102. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593 (2010). 
 103. See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes:  An Audience 
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 380 (2015) (“The [Supreme] Court seems 
quite reticent to revisit its case law—in any patent context for that matter—to 
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appropriate test for business method claims.104  In light of Laboratory 
Corp., it was clear that the Federal Circuit was attempting to head off 
Supreme Court review.105  Of course, such efforts proved futile as the 
Court granted certiorari in Bilski.106 
The Federal Circuit’s intransigence was not yet done, however.  
After deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two 
parallel cases, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC107 and 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,108 vacated the 
Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the cases for 
reconsideration (GVR) in light of Bilski.109 
In Classen, the invention related to “methods for evaluating and 
improving the safety of immunization schedules.”110  The district 
court invalidated the claims for want of patentable subject matter.111  
In a one paragraph decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment in light of the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in 
In re Bilski.112  After the Supreme Court GVR’d the case, the Federal 
Circuit on remand changed its original conclusions, finding that two 
of the three claims were not invalid under § 101.113  Of course, a GVR 
does not mean the Supreme Court necessarily disagreed with the 
outcome below,114 but the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski made it 
easier to invalidate claims on the basis of § 101.  Yet, on remand, the 
                                                        
evaluate whether its doctrine is consistent.  Instead of grappling with the 
inconsistencies in its own decisions, the Court simply recites facts and holdings from 
its earlier jurisprudence in the hopes that one can discern consistencies.”). 
 104. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56.  For criticism of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in 
Bilski, see Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
419, 429–32 (2012) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s interpretations of Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), as requiring the machine-or-transformation test). 
 105. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (recognizing that the Supreme Court may change or 
altogether eliminate the “machine-or-transformation” test to accommodate new 
technologies). 
 106. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 107. No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 
F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded by 561 U.S. 1040 
(2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 108. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded by 561 U.S. 
1040 (2010), rev’d, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 109. 561 U.S. 1040. 
 110. Classen, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1. 
 111. Id. at *6. 
 112. Classen, 304 F. App’x at 867. 
 113. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1059. 
 114. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (noting that a GVR order “does not create an implication that the lower court 
should change its prior determination”). 
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court found previously invalidated claims to not be invalid, which is 
incongruent with the holding in Bilski.  Showing further resistance, 
Judge Rader, joined by Judge Newman, offered additional views on 
the case, arguing that the Federal Circuit “should decline to accept 
invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.”115  In Judge Rader’s 
view, patentable subject matter is a “coarse filter” that should not be 
used extensively.116  Judge Moore, the author of the original panel 
decision, dissented, arguing that the case was “not even close.”117  
Thus, the Federal Circuit resisted the guidance of the Supreme Court 
in Bilski under which more patents would be invalid for claiming 
ineligible subject matter. 
The Federal Circuit’s resistance to the Supreme Court became 
even more apparent in Prometheus.  The original panel had held that 
the patented invention—a correlation of metabolite levels in the 
blood to optimize the dosage of a drug—constituted eligible subject 
matter.118  After the GVR, the court stood its ground and held, again, 
that the patent claimed patentable subject matter under § 101.119  
The Federal Circuit gave short shrift to Bilski120:  much of the 
language in the decision on remand was verbatim to the earlier 
decision.121  Such dismissive treatment of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bilski likely did not sit well with the Court, triggering the 
subsequent substantive review—and rejection—of the Federal 
Circuit’s judgment in the case.122 
                                                        
 115. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074 (Rader and Newman, JJ., additional views).  Because two 
judges joined these additional views, technically it should be part of the majority opinion. 
 116. Id.; see also Holbrook & Janis, supra note 103, at 352–53 (discussing the Federal 
Circuit’s competing conceptions of § 101 as a coarse filter versus “eligibility-as-king”). 
 117. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1078 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 118. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded by 561 U.S. 1040 (2010), rev’d, 628 
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 119. Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1349 (“On remand, we again hold that Prometheus’s 
asserted method claims are drawn to statutory subject matter, and we again reverse 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity under § 101.”). 
 120. Id. at 1355 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski did not undermine our 
preemption analysis of Prometheus’s claims and it rejected the machine-or-
transformation test only as a definitive test. . . .  Thus, the Court did not disavow the 
machine-or-transformation test.  And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful 
and important clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling 
conclusion, [namely], that the present claims pass muster under § 101.”). 
 121. Compare id. at 1356–57, with Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346–47. 
 122. Holbrook, supra note 88, at 73–74. 
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The Prometheus pattern between the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court repeated itself in the Myriad string of cases.123  The 
Federal Circuit initially held that claims covering breast cancer-
related genes were patentable subject matter.124  The Supreme Court 
GVR’d the case in light of Prometheus.125  On remand, the Federal 
Circuit again found the claims patent eligible, marginalizing the 
importance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Prometheus.126  And, 
again, the Supreme Court granted review.127  The Court held that the 
claims to isolated DNA were ineligible but those to complementary 
DNA were eligible128—the only time the Supreme Court has found a 
claim to cover eligible subject matter in its recent line of § 101 cases. 
The import of these decisions began to sink in, apparently, with 
some of the Federal Circuit judges.  The court’s fractured en banc 
decision in Alice Corp. shows, to some extent, a shift at the court and a 
willingness to defer to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on § 
101.129  Of course, it also shows the lack of guidance in the Supreme 
Court’s precedent.130  The Supreme Court’s decision to review the 
case, however, appears to be because of the fracture at the Federal 
Circuit and not a failure of the court to appreciate the earlier 
Supreme Court decisions.  Of course, there is a bit of irony in the 
Supreme Court chastising the Federal Circuit for disrupting the 
settled expectations of the innovation community when the Court’s 
                                                        
 123. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); see also Holbrook, supra note 88, at 73. 
 124. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334. 
 125. Myriad Genetics, 132 S. Ct. 1794. 
 126. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the Supreme Court decision in Mayo did 
not control the issue at hand), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); id. at 1326 (noting that 
Mayo provided insight and outlined the broad principles at issue but holding that 
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers were the more directly applicable precedents). 
 127. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012). 
 128. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 129. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 130. Tim Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court About to Rule that Software Is Ineligible for 
Patent Protection?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
realspin/2014/03/16/is-the-supreme-court-about-to-rule-that-software-is-ineligible-
for-patent-protection. 
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rulings themselves utterly reshaped the legal landscape in terms of 
patent-eligible subject matter.131 
B. In Part Due to the Supreme Court and Congress, the Gravitational Pull 
of the Patent System Shifts Towards the USPTO 
The Federal Circuit’s dynamic with the USPTO also began to 
change during this period.  Some of this change may have been in 
response to the Supreme Court’s reengagement with patent law, 
bringing the Court’s administrative eye to patent law.  In particular, 
the Court agreed with the USPTO that the APA applied to its fact-
finding.132  After Dickinson v. Zurko,133 it was clear the USPTO was to 
be treated the same as other administrative agencies. 
This shift in viewing the USPTO akin to other agencies began to 
take hold at the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit was poised to 
micromanage procedural aspects of the USPTO, although it 
mainly deferred to what the USPTO had done.134  After growing 
criticism that patent applicants could file limitless numbers of 
continuation applications,135 the USPTO promulgated rules to 
limit the number of such filings as well as the number of claims in 
an application.136  A number of parties challenged the rules, and 
the district court hearing the challenge agreed that the USPTO 
had exceeded its rulemaking authority.137 
The Federal Circuit partly agreed with the district court.  The 
expert court confirmed that the USPTO has no substantive 
                                                        
 131. See Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and 
the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 74 (2016) (noting that before the 
Supreme Court cases, “challenges to patentability based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 were 
rare,” but such challenges “now consume a significant portion of [the Federal 
Circuit’s] docket”). 
 132. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). 
 133. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 134. William G. Jenks, I Lost at the USPTO, What Are My Chances on Appeal?, 
LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 26, 27. 
 135. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004) (explaining that the patent system allowed 
unlimited attempts to persuade a patent examiner to approve an application). 
 136. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007). 
 137. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that “the 
USPTO’s rulemaking authority . . . does not extend to substantive rules,” so the 
substantive rules at issue were void), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Tafas v. 
Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
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rulemaking authority.138  The court also agreed that the USPTO is 
entitled to Chevron deference when it promulgates procedural 
rules.139  The Federal Circuit, unlike the district court, concluded that 
the rules at issue were procedural.140  The court ultimately ruled that 
all but one of the rules was a legitimate exercise of USPTO 
authority.141  The Federal Circuit, therefore, initially demurred to a 
radical departure in USPTO practice.  The court subsequently took 
the case en banc,142 but it never reached a decision.  When there was 
a change in the presidential administration, the USPTO withdrew the 
new rules, mooting the case.143  It is hard to predict what the en banc 
court would have done, perhaps invalidating all of the rules in a 
manner akin to the court’s earlier history.  The panel decision, 
however, demonstrated a willingness to defer to the USPTO in ways 
that seem different from the court’s earlier era. 
The shift in the Federal Circuit’s relationship with the USPTO took 
a hard turn in 2011 when Congress adopted the AIA.  The AIA 
created a variety of post-issuance review proceedings.144  The most 
important of these is the inter partes review (IPR).145  These 
proceedings created alternatives to the district courts to allow parties 
to challenge the validity of patents.146  These proceedings have 
proven to be exceedingly popular, and appeals from the USPTO have 
begun to dominate the Federal Circuit’s docket.147  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the relationship between the Federal 
Circuit and the USPTO has changed. 
                                                        
 138. Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1352–53. 
 139. Id. at 1354. 
 140. Id. at 1356. 
 141. Id. at 1349. 
 142. Tafas, 328 F. App’x 658. 
 143. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (Oct. 14, 2009). 
 144. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011). 
 145. IPR is a proceeding to determine patentability on a ground that could be 
raised under sections 102 or 103.  Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trial 
s/inter-partes-review (last updated Jan. 29, 2016). 
 146. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 301 (allowing for inter partes review to 
challenge a patent only if the petitioner has not yet filed a civil claim). 
 147. Jason Rantanen, Data on Federal Circuit Appeals and Decisions, PATENTLY-O 
(June 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/circuit-appeals-decisions.html. 
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III. THE MODERN ERA:  ACQUIESCENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT AND 
TO USPTO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
In the last few years, these dynamics have shifted noticeably.  The 
Supreme Court has reengaged significantly in patent law, reviewing 
over forty patent cases (depending on what counts as a “patent” case) 
since 2000.148  These cases now deal with core patent law issues.149  
The Court has reworked the law of induced infringement,150 given 
deference to fact-finding in claim construction,151 and made it easier 
to shift attorney fees152 and demonstrate willful infringement.153  
Indeed, causing more psychodrama than perhaps any other area is 
the tetralogy of cases dealing with patentable subject matter that 
effected a seismic shift in the law.154 
There has been a similar sea change at the USPTO.  With the 
passage of the AIA, the USPTO has become a popular venue for 
challenging patents through the various post-issuance proceedings, 
particularly IPRs.155  Appeals from IPRs have come to dominate the 
Federal Circuit’s docket. 
The Federal Circuit’s response to both of these changes has been 
somewhat surprising:  acquiescence.  The Federal Circuit generally 
has taken the Supreme Court’s decisions to heart and is attempting 
                                                        
 148. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court Concerned with Patent Law, the 
Federal Circuit, or Both:  A Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyk, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
 149. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 1–2 (2007) (explaining the Court’s shift from addressing 
issues on the periphery of patent law to cases that go to the heart of patent issues). 
 150. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015); 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).  See generally 
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent 
Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1010–25 (2016) (discussing four Supreme 
Court cases impacting doctrine of inducing infringement). 
 151. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015). 
 152. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 
1752–53 (2014). 
 153. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016). 
 154. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 155. Rich Steeves, Inter Partes Review Gains in Popularity, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 13, 
2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/03/13/inter-partes-review-gains-in-popularity. 
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to follow them, even if the Federal Circuit judges happen to disagree 
with the Court.156 
A. The Federal Circuit Falls in Line (Even at Times when Patent 
Practitioners Wanted Them to Push Back) 
The Supreme Court’s deluge of cases has rejected many of the 
bright-line rules created by the Federal Circuit.157  The Court rejected 
the absolute bar rule for prosecution history estoppel;158 the nearly 
per se grant of permanent injunctions after a finding of infringement;159 
the “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction;160 and the court’s formalistic application of the teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test to combine prior art references to 
conclude a claimed invention is non-obvious, such that an invention can 
be obvious if it is obvious to try.161  More recent decisions have thrown 
out the Federal Circuit’s formalistic rules for fee-shifting and 
enhanced damages, along with the attending de novo review 
standards that aggrandized the Federal Circuit’s power.162 
The Federal Circuit generally has followed these shifts in the law.  
It has found the Festo presumption of complete surrender of equivalents 
to be rebutted in a few cases.163  It has permitted far more denials of 
permanent injunctions than in the past.164  The court has even reversed 
                                                        
 156. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(en banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 157. See Dyk, supra note 131, at 80–81; Holbrook, supra note 88, at 76–77.  For a 
thorough discussion and evaluation of the relationship between the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court as to formalistic rules, see generally David O. Taylor, 
Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication:  Precedent and Policy, 66 SMU L. 
REV. 633 (2013). 
 158. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002). 
 159. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
 160. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007). 
 161. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 
 162. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016); Octane 
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014); Highmark 
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1746–47 (2014). 
 163. Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  Conspicuously, the Federal Circuit has never found the Festo presumption 
rebutted on the basis of unforeseeability. 
 164. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay:  
An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1982–83 (2016). 
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the grant of a permanent injunction.165  The Federal Circuit also 
expressly rejected its “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, instead now using a more holistic, 
contextual analysis.166  Perhaps most tellingly, the Federal Circuit has 
stepped back from its use of the TSM test and has embraced the 
“obvious to try” methodology of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.167 
The court appears to have acquiesced in the chaos flowing from 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on eligible subject matter.  In 
cases involving § 101 challenges, the court now readily affirms the 
district courts’ judgments of invalidity.168  Indeed, it is the vast 
minority of cases where the court finds the claimed invention to 
constitute eligible subject matter when the issue is raised.169  Many 
observers hoped the Federal Circuit would push back against the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.170  The particular vehicle for this hope 
                                                        
 165. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
But see Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal:  An 
Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 149 
(2017) (noting that the Federal Circuit affirms grants of permanent injunctions at a 
significantly higher rate than it affirms denials). 
 166. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1283–84 
(Fed. Cir. 2007); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 167. 550 U.S. 398 (2007); see Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 
1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Insofar as Deuel implies the obviousness inquiry cannot consider that the 
combination of the claim’s constituent elements was ‘obvious to try,’ the Supreme 
Court in KSR unambiguously discredited that holding.”). 
 168. Jason Rantanen, Section 101—Pivotal Moment for Clarity on Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 21, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/sectio 
n-subject-eligibility.html; David Scannell et al., A Chilly Reception for Section 101 
Challenges at the ITC, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP:  MOFO @ ITC (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://mofoatitc.mofo.com/alj-decisions/a-chilly-reception-for-section-101-challenge 
s-at-the-itc. 
 169. Rantanen, supra note 168 (noting that seventy percent of cases result in 
invalidity). 
 170. See, e.g., id. (asserting that the Federal Circuit must delineate the “proper 
scope and application of [s]ection 101” so that the United States can maintain “its 
competitive edge” in the biotech and software industries); The Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO) and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and in Favor of En Banc 
Reconsideration (Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1144), Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, 
Inc., 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Michael A. Sanzo, The Patenting of Gene Based 
Diagnostic Assays in a Post Mayo and Myriad World, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 1, 16 (2016) (“To the extent that people in the patent community may have 
maintained any lingering hope for something similar after the decision discussed 
above, this hope was badly damaged by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariosa v. 
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was the case Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.171  The invention 
related to the discovery of cell-free fetal DNA (“cffDNA”) in maternal 
plasma and serum, which can be used to diagnose various genetic 
abnormalities in a fetus.172  The use of cffDNA revolutionized 
obstetrics, permitting diagnosis without the use of higher-risk, 
intrusive amniocentesis.173  If any case seemed appropriate to offer 
resistance to the Supreme Court, this case appeared to be the one. 
Yet the Federal Circuit held that the claims covering this 
revolutionary technology were not patent-eligible subject matter.174  In 
a surprising level of transparency, a number of the judges expressly 
noted that they believed the invention to be patent-eligible but were 
nonetheless bound by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.175  The 
judges went as far as to offer critiques of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions, yet they continued to adhere to those decisions.176 
                                                        
Sequenom.”); Christopher Holman, Federal Circuit Decides Ariosa, and It’s Not Good News 
for Innovation in the Life Sciences, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (June 12, 2015), 
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/federal-circuit-decides-ariosa-
and-its.html. 
 171. 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016). 
 172. Id. at 1373–74. 
 173. Philip Merksamer, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom:  Metastasis of Mayo and 
Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent Eligibility for Molecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 495, 495 (2016). 
 174. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1373. 
 175. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“In sum, it is unsound 
to have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility 
on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus conventional steps, or 
that they claim abstract concepts.  But I agree that the panel did not err in its 
conclusion that under Supreme Court precedent it had no option other than to 
affirm the district court.”); id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“Yet I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that a too restrictive test 
for patent eligibility . . . may discourage development and disclosure of new 
diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the life sciences . . . .  This leads me to think 
that some further illumination as to the scope of Mayo would be beneficial in one 
limited aspect.  At the same time I think that we are bound by the language of Mayo, 
and any further guidance must come from the Supreme Court, not this court.”); 
Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) (“I join the court’s opinion . . . only 
because I am bound by the sweeping language of the test set out in [Mayo] . . . .  This 
case represents the consequence—perhaps unintended—of that broad language in 
excluding a meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves and should 
have been entitled to retain.”). 
 176. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“But against the accusation that such a claim to the invention might be 
considered mere draftsmanship and thus still ineligible under the seemingly 
expansive holding of Mayo, it must be said that a process, composition of matter, 
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The modern Federal Circuit, therefore, appears to have acquiesced 
to the deluge of Supreme Court review.  It generally has embraced 
the changes in the law with less resistance than one might expect 
from an expert court. 
B. Federal Circuit Defers to USPTO in IPR Proceedings 
The Federal Circuit’s acquiescence to the Supreme Court parallels 
its new-found deference to the USPTO.  IPRs and post-grant reviews 
have proven to be quite popular, with large numbers of petitions—
particularly IPRs—filed.177  These filings have resulted in an 
explosion in the number of appeals to the Federal Circuit from the 
USPTO.178  These new proceedings have the potential to 
fundamentally rework the relationships among the USPTO, the 
district courts, and the Federal Circuit.179  The Federal Circuit already 
appears to be deferring readily to decisions by the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB),180 though this deference could be in part due 
to a self-interest in avoiding drowning in the deluge of appeals. 
Interestingly, however, the Federal Circuit has also hamstrung its 
own ability to review various aspects of PTAB decisions.  In In re 
                                                        
article of manufacture, and machine are different implementations of ideas, and 
differentiating among them in claim drafting is a laudable professional skill, not 
necessarily a devious device for avoiding prohibitions.”); id. at 1289–90 (Dyk, J., 
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“I worry that method claims that apply 
newly discovered natural laws and phenomena in somewhat conventional ways are 
screened out by the Mayo test.  In this regard I think that Mayo may not be entirely 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad.”). 
 177. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making 
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 66 (2016) 
(revealing that the number of petitions for IPR filed per month has risen from 20 
when the IPR procedure became available to approximately 140). 
 178. Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Now Receiving More Appeals Arising from the PTO 
than the District Courts, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/201 
6/03/receiving-appeals-district.html. 
 179. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:  
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2015). 
 180. Christopher A. Suarez, Navigating Inter Partes Review in the Federal Circuit:  A 
Statistical Review, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 49, 50 (finding that the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the PTAB in IPRs eighty-two percent of the time; sixty-one percent of 
Federal Circuit’s IPR decisions are summary affirmances under Rule 36); Matt 
Cutler, Federal Circuit Broadly Affirms PTAB’s Determinations on Analogous Art, Motivation 
to Combine References, and Obviousness of Claims, IPR-PGR.COM (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://ipr-pgr.com/federal-circuit-broadly-affirms-ptabs-determinations-on-analogou 
s-art-motivation-to-combine-references-and-obviousness-of-claims. 
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Cuozzo Speeding Technologies, LLC,181 the Federal Circuit confronted, 
inter alia, two issues that related to the relationship between the 
USPTO and the court.182  The first was whether the Federal Circuit 
could review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR after the PTAB 
had reached a final decision.183  The second was whether the PTAB 
was appropriately using the “broadest reasonable interpretation” 
(BRI) standard for claim construction, which is used by USPTO 
patent examiners during the prosecution of a patent application,184 
instead of the standard used in district court litigation.185 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO on both issues.  As to 
the court’s ability to review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR, the 
Federal Circuit provided a strong prohibition on such review.186  The 
court looked to the language of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), which notes that 
the decision whether to institute review is “final and nonappealable.”187  
The court viewed this as a complete prohibition on the ability of the 
court to review the PTAB’s decision to institute review, even if there 
may be some flaws in that analysis or questions about the USPTO’s 
authority.188  In those scenarios, a petition for mandamus may be a 
means of review, but review as a matter of right is not available.189 
As to the claim construction standard, the court held that Congress 
had implicitly adopted the BRI standard.190  The court reasoned that 
“[t]here is no indication that the AIA was designed to change the 
claim construction standard that the PTO has applied for more than 
100 years.”191  As such, “[i]t can therefore be inferred that Congress 
impliedly approved the existing rule of adopting the broadest 
reasonable construction.”192  The court rejected the argument that 
the limited ability to amend the claims in an IPR justified departure 
                                                        
 181. 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. 
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 182. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273, 1275. 
 183. Id. at 1272–73. 
 184. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 
 185. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1275. 
 186. Id. at 1273. 
 187. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). 
 188. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1274 (“Cuozzo argues that Congress would not have 
intended to allow the PTO to institute IPR in direct contravention of the 
statute . . . .”). 
 189. Id. (explaining that a petitioner must show a “clear and indisputable right” or 
“irremediable interim harm” to pursue mandamus). 
 190. Id. at 1278. 
 191. Id. at 1276–77. 
 192. Id. 
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from the BRI standard, which had been justified on the ability of an 
applicant to routinely amend her claims to avoid a patentability 
problem during prosecution.193  Additionally, even if Congress did 
not implicitly embrace the BRI standard, the court concluded it was a 
reasonable exercise of USPTO rulemaking authority.194 
Both of these holdings show deference to the USPTO.  The first 
limits the ability of the Federal Circuit to second-guess the PTAB’s 
decisions.  The second, although initially couched in terms of 
congressional intent, also demonstrates a willingness to defer to 
USPTO rulemaking.  In some regards, this deference represents an 
erosion of the “procedural v. substantive” rulemaking line.  Indeed, it 
is not entirely clear whether the claim construction standard should 
be viewed as substantive or procedural.195 
The Supreme Court did review Cuozzo, and it ultimately agreed 
with the Federal Circuit on both issues.196  Its reasoning, however, 
differed in many regards from that of the Federal Circuit’s decision.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court decision reads far more like an 
administrative law decision than a patent law one.197  The Court’s 
reasoning as to the reviewability issue differed from that of the 
Federal Circuit, and it appears to have opened the door to review of 
some initiation decisions, such as those raising constitutional issues or 
an abuse of authority by the USPTO.198  As to the BRI claim 
construction standard, the Court did not find an implicit adoption of 
that standard by Congress; instead, it performed a traditional Chevron 
analysis, concluding that the regulations adopting the BRI standard 
properly filled a “gap” in the statutory framework.199 
The Federal Circuit seemingly has turned a new page in its 
relationship with the USPTO.  It is now, after some reminding by the 
                                                        
 193. Id. at 1277–78. 
 194. Id. at 1278–79. 
 195. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact 
on Claim Construction, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 319 (2016). 
 196. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016). 
 197. See Holbrook, supra note 195, at 20–23. 
 198. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141 (“This means that we need not, and do not, decide 
the precise effect of § 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that 
depend on other less closely related statutes, or that present other questions of 
interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well beyond ‘this section.’”); 
see also Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. Athena Automation Ltd., 838 F.3d 1236, 
1243 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 199. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142 (“The statute contains such a gap:  No statutory 
provision unambiguously directs the agency to use one standard or the other.”); see 
also id. at 2144–45. 
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Supreme Court, that the USPTO is an administrative agency, and review 
of its rules and decisions should be treated accordingly.200  The Federal 
Circuit has begun to afford the USPTO deference in this regard. 
CONCLUSION—WILL THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CONTINUE TO ACQUIESCE 
IN AQUA AND WI-FI ONE? 
The above analysis suggests that there has been a shift at the 
Federal Circuit with respect to its relationships with the Supreme Court 
and the USPTO.  Early in its existence—and with some justification—
the Federal Circuit made itself the center of patent law.  In more recent 
years, however, it has allowed the responsibility for the development of 
patent law to diffuse to both the Supreme Court and the USPTO. 
Of course, the image portrayed in this Essay is a bit of a caricature.  
First, any shift in the perspective of the Federal Circuit has evolved 
over time, so the demarcations above are somewhat arbitrary.  
Second, there are examples of where the Federal Circuit may yet be 
obstinate in the face of Supreme Court precedent.  For example, in 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,201 the Supreme Court 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s twenty-year-old de novo standard of 
review for claim construction.202  The Court concluded that there are 
facts incident to claim construction such that, when present, the 
Federal Circuit should review the district court’s fact-finding for clear 
error.203  Instead of ushering in a dramatic change in patent litigation, 
Teva has proven to be a non-moment.204  In order to avoid deference, 
the Federal Circuit generally viewed the intrinsic evidence—the claims, 
specification, and prosecution history—as unambiguous,205 review of 
                                                        
 200. Accord Rai, supra note 46, at 201 (calling for treatment of the USPTO as an 
administrative agency). 
 201. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 202. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (confirming de novo review of claim construction), 
abrogated by Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836; Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 
1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (confirming de novo review established in 
Markman), abrogated by Teva Pharm., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836; Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that claim 
construction is reviewed de novo), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 203. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 838. 
 204. See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 430, 448 (2015) (explaining how the Federal Circuit has “managed to 
marginalize Teva v. Sandoz”). 
 205. Id.; see also Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. 
Sandoz, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deferen 
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which is performed de novo even under Teva.206  As such, the Federal 
Circuit has worked to undermine the holding in Teva. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit appears to be grafting a brighter rule 
onto its permanent injunction analysis.  The Supreme Court in eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.207 faulted both the district court and the 
Federal Circuit for using a categorical analysis in determining the 
appropriateness of a permanent injunction.208  In recent cases, 
however, the Federal Circuit has articulated a requirement for a 
“causal nexus” between the acts of infringement and the irreparable 
harm to the patent holder.209  Some commentators view this as the 
emergence of another categorical requirement, in contravention of 
eBay.210  Additionally, a recent study shows that the Federal Circuit is 
far more likely to reverse a denial of a permanent injunction than a 
grant, suggesting that the court is not deferring to district courts and 
is applying the eBay standard in a pro-patent way.211  This difference 
arises even though the standard of review is abuse of discretion.212 
That said, perhaps such reversals are not surprising given the 
court’s expertise.  Indeed, in an apparent thaw at the Supreme Court, 
Justice Breyer suggested that the Federal Circuit’s expertise could 
inform discretionary review in a different context.  After years of 
generally criticizing the Federal Circuit’s doctrine,213 Justice Breyer’s 
                                                        
ce-supreme-sandoz.html (“The Federal Circuit will continue to use the Phillips 
hierarchy, turning to extrinsic evidence only when the intrinsic evidence is 
ambiguous.  I think, in the main, the Federal Circuit will view the intrinsic evidence 
as determinative, retaining de novo review in the vast majority of cases.” (quoting 
Timothy R. Holbrook)). 
 206. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841 (“As all parties agree, when the district court 
reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, 
along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount 
solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that 
construction de novo.”). 
 207. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 208. Id. at 393. 
 209. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  See 
generally Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 61 (2016) (discussing the causation requirement and the Federal 
Circuit’s arguable watering down of the requirement). 
 210. David H. Dolkas & Rita J. Yoon, Supreme Court’s eBay Decision on Patent 
Injunctions—Time for a Comeback?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.bna.com/supreme-courts-ebay-n17179924841. 
 211. Holte & Seaman, supra note 165, at 46–48. 
 212. Id. at 46–47. 
 213. See, e.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 
(2014) (“The Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means 
to infringe a method patent.”). 
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concurrence in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.214 gestures 
to the Federal Circuit’s expertise, the first such reference since 
Warner-Jenkinson nineteen years earlier: “The Court holds that awards 
of enhanced damages should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
I agree.  But I also believe that, in applying that standard, the Federal 
Circuit may take advantage of its own experience and expertise in 
patent law.”215  There may be a thawing on the part of the Supreme 
Court with respect to its views of the Federal Circuit. 
The acts of the Supreme Court are outside the control of the 
Federal Circuit.  But the Federal Circuit does control its relationship 
with the USPTO.  Although it seems the court has entered an era of 
deference to the USPTO, two pending en banc cases could portend a 
change in that dynamic.  The era of Federal Circuit acquiescence, at 
least with respect to the USPTO, may be coming to a close.216 
The Federal Circuit recently heard argument en banc in In re Aqua 
Products, Inc.217  The case involved the ability of patent holders in IPRs 
to amend their claims.218  The USPTO has been stingy in allowing 
such amendments.219  The Federal Circuit initially deferred to the 
rules promulgated by the USPTO.220  The court is now questioning 
those rules and seems poised to reject them.221 
                                                        
 214. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 215. Id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 216. Hence, the “(?)” in this Essay’s title. 
 217. 833 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam) (argument on Dec. 9, 2016). 
 218. Id. at 1336. 
 219. See In Rare Move, PTAB Grants Motion to Amend in IPR Proceeding, NAT’L L. REV. 
(May 3, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/rare-move-ptab-grants-motion-to-
amend-ipr-proceeding (explaining that while 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 permits claim 
amendments, it allows courts to deny motions to amend where “the amendment does not 
respond to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial, or if the amendment seeks to 
enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter”). 
 220. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Prolitec, 
Inc. v. ScentAir Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  But see Veritas 
Techs. LLC v. Veeam Software Corp., 835 F.3d 1406, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding 
PTAB abused its discretion in refusing amendment). 
 221. The en banc order requested briefing on two particular issues: 
(a) When the patent owner moves to amend its claims under 35 U.S.C. § 
316(d), may the PTO require the patent owner to bear the burden of 
persuasion, or a burden of production, regarding patentability of the 
amended claims as a condition of allowing them?  Which burdens are 
permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)? 
(b) When the petitioner does not challenge the patentability of a proposed 
amended claim, or the Board thinks the challenge is inadequate, may the 
Board sua sponte raise patentability challenges to such a claim? If so, where 
would the burden of persuasion, or a burden of production, lie? 
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The court is also rehearing en banc Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom 
Corp.222 and will address whether the court has the power to review 
the USPTO’s determinations of timeliness in IPR proceedings.223 
If the court does reject the USPTO’s amendment rules or 
empowers itself to review issues of timeliness, these decisions will be 
the court’s first significant interventions with the USPTO’s 
regulations post-AIA, demonstrating that the Federal Circuit may be 
ready to challenge the USPTO’s dominance in this area.  Such 
interventions likely will trigger Supreme Court review.  As such, the 
relationships among the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and the 
USPTO are likely to continue to evolve. 
                                                        
Aqua Prods., 833 F.3d at 1336. 
 222. 837 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated by, and rehearing en banc granted, Nos. 
2015-1944, 2015-1945, 2015-1946, 2017 WL 957224, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2017). 
 223. The specific question presented is, 
Should this court overrule Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 
F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and hold that judicial review is available for a 
patent owner to challenge the PTO’s determination that the petitioner 
satisfied the timeliness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) governing the 
filing of petitions for inter partes review? 
Wi-Fi One, 2017 WL 957224, at *1. 
